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Russia is due to hold parliamentary elections on 18 September. To coincide with the elections, we
will be running a number of articles on Russian politics and society. In this contribution, Evgeny
Gontmakher writes on why Russian citizens still continue to show strong support for the current
government despite a faltering economy. He notes that part of the explanation lies in the strong
economic performance of Russia between 2000 and 2014, while the lack of a genuinely effective
opposition that can inspire Russians to voice discontent has also played a role.
Over the last few decades, Russia has repeatedly experienced severe economic difficulties. In the
early 1990s, Russia’s economy stopped growing and started to shrink. This process accelerated after the start of
radical reforms in 1992. A slight recovery was observed immediately before the default of 1998, which once again
reduced the country’s GDP. Sustainable growth, which lasted until 2008, only began in the year 2000.
During these years the Russian population suffered greatly. In comparison with the situation in 1990, real incomes
fell by almost half and due to chronic underfunding there were significant problems in the provision of public
healthcare and education. By the late 1990s, there were even mounting debts of several months’ worth of pension
and public sector salary payments.
The social effects of this situation were evident in a greatly decreased birth rate and higher mortality rates,
particularly among middle-aged men. But at the same time it should be noted that the 1990s were not accompanied
by large scale social protests. The only exceptions to this were the mining strikes between 1997 and 1998.
Nevertheless, these protests did not lead to any major changes in social policy. The changes that did occur in the
composition of the Russian government instead reflected conflicts between Russia’s political elite.
This raises the question of why, despite the major deterioration in conditions within the country, the Russian
population did not articulate a greater level of discontent at the decisions made by their political leaders. The first
step in answering this question is to recognise the legacy of the Soviet-era, where an essentially totalitarian regime
had to some extent managed to alter the perceptions and wider outlook of a majority of its population. In the words of
Yuri Levada and his colleagues, the effect of this was to create homo soveticus: fully socialised men and women
who were strongly adapted to the given and inevitable social reality.
As they state, ‘at the individual level inherent in the Soviet system the whole system of transactions with the
government inevitably resulted in moral corruption… [with] cronyism, bribery and doublethinking a necessary
condition for the functioning of the economy and society.’ The collapse of the Soviet system did not bring this to an
end, but ‘only eliminated the social and institutional regulators that had limited the effect of the corrupting
mechanisms’.
Given this context, there is nothing surprising in the fact that Russia lacked political actors who could take the lead in
organising protests, as well as individuals who were able and willing to become involved in an opposition movement.
In contrast in Poland, for instance, where the Soviet regime had only lasted 40 years and was not as rigid as it was
in the Soviet Union, this situation quickly gave way to ‘Solidarity’.
The new Russian government, despite its democratic and economic reforms in the 1990s, showed complete
inflexibility in dealing with the country’s opposition. Vladimir Putin, who came to power in 2000, appeared a welcome
sign of change. But this change of leadership had a short-term stabilising effect, not least because it occurred at a
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time of rapid growth in world oil prices. This provided an opportunity for the government to quickly resolve the debts
on pension and salary payments, before beginning to increase social programmes.
By 2008, using the inflation adjusted official figures, household incomes and average pension payments were 2.2
times higher than they had been in 2000, while the average salary was 2.8 times higher. A broadly similar increase
occurred in the health and education budgets. People began to buy cars, take out loans to buy houses, and go on
vacation at increased rates, while the number of births also significantly increased as it appeared this level of social
progress would continue for the foreseeable future.
Such was the strength of this belief that the economic crisis of 2008-10 did little to dampen the new sense of
optimism in Russian society. The state acted to prevent a decline in social conditions – in many respects conditions
even continued to improve until 2014. But this picture did not last and for almost two years now, Russians have been
experiencing declining real income and wages in real terms, and a health care system that is becoming less
affordable.
With this stated, the scale of this process is still relatively small. For instance, in 2014-15, the decline in the
population’s real income levels was only 5 percent. This is much smaller than the radical growth experienced since
2000. But there is also another reason why social protest has proven unpopular among Russians: the lack of a
genuine opposition movement that could inspire citizens to voice their discontent. This partly reflects the
transformation the authorities have managed to bring about in the nature of the country’s political system.
Finally, the Russian government has waged a successful information and propaganda campaign to convince citizens
that most of the current social difficulties being experienced are temporary. Putin has been presented to the
population as a charismatic leader of the nation, capable of finding a way forward, in spite of the current challenges.
And the combination of these factors ensures that it is likely there will be no large-scale protests in Russia any time
soon.
All macroeconomic projections, including the official ones produced in Russia, indicate that in the next 10-15 years
economic growth will barely exceed 1.5 percent per year. This means that at best the long stagnation of living
standards will continue for the majority of people. If the government decides to deepen its reforms, not only in an
economic sense but also those aimed at reforming the country’s political institutions, the picture may be more
positive.
But these reforms are also likely to be socially painful, for example the closing of inefficient workplaces, which
employ a large number of people. It is an open question whether under these conditions the current regime will
continue to enjoy public support long-term, or whether it may ultimately be replaced in the Ukrainian manner. The
answer to this question will not be found in the upcoming elections on 18 September, but rather in the coming years.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. Featured image: Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin at a rally on Moscow’s
Manezh Square / credits: kremlin.ru.
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